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Economists and policy makers have long recognized that innovators must be able to appropriate a
reasonable portion of the social benefits of their innovations if innovation is to be suitably rewarded
and encouraged.  However, this paper identifies a number of specific fact patterns under which the
current U.S. patent system allows patent holders to capture private rewards that exceed their social
contributions.  Such excessive patentee rewards are socially costly, since they raise the deadweight
loss associated with the patent system and discourage innovation by others. Economic efficiency is
promoted if rewards to patent holders are aligned with and do not exceed their social contributions.
This paper analyzes two major reforms to the patent system designed to spur innovation by better
aligning the rewards and contributions of patent holders: establishing an independent invention defense
in patent infringement cases, and strengthening the procedures by which patents are re-examined after
they are issued.  Three additional reforms relating to patent litigation are also studied: limiting the
use of injunctions, clarifying the way in which "reasonable royalties" are calculated, and narrowing
the definition of "willful infringement."
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I.  Introduction 
A growing chorus of scholars and practitioners are expressing concerns about the operation of 
the U.S. patent system.
1  While there is no doubt that the U.S. economy remains highly 
innovative, and there is no doubt that the patent system taken as a whole plays an important role 
in spurring innovation, the general consensus is that the U.S. patent system is out of balance and 
can be substantially improved.  Problems with the system seem to reside especially in the fields 
of information technology and biotechnology. 
Going back to economic first principles, this paper argues that the efficiency of the current U.S. 
patent system can be significantly enhanced by reforming the system in two major ways .  First, 
an independent invention defense could be established in patent infringement cases.  Under such 
a defense, a party accused of patent infringement can avoid liability if it can establish that it 
independently invented the patented technology.  Second, a much more effective procedure 
could be established for re-examining selected patents after they are issued by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO).  The central goal of this paper is to illuminate the strong economic 
logic behind patent reform proposals along these lines, without delving deeply into the specifics 
of how they would be implemented in practice.  Additional reforms are also addressed. 
The core problem with the current U.S. patent system explored here is that, in certain identifiable 
circumstances, the patent system predictably provides excessive rewards to patent holders.  The 
term “excessive rewards” is defined here to mean rewards that exceed the patentee’s actual 
contribution to economic welfare.  Excessive rewards are not benign, since they come at the 
expense of other parties.  In the short term, excessive rewards cause deadweight loss by raising 
the cost of goods and services supplied by technology users who pay excessive royalties or incur 
other costs to avoid liability for patent infringement.  Even more important, in the long term, 
excessive rewards to some patentees reduce economic efficiency by discouraging innovation by 
other parties whose costs are elevated or whose options are restricted. 
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This central problem has multiple manifestations, which are reflected in a number of seemingly 
disparate criticisms commonly made of the system, including the following: 
•  Patents are regularly issued covering technologies that should in fact be considered 
“obvious.”
2     
•  Patents are commonly issued by the PTO for technologies that are not in fact “novel,” 
due in part to the difficulties of finding prior art during the PTO examination process.
3 
•  Patent applicants often obtain patents with overly broad claims, including claims 
explicitly drafted in continuation applications to capture products introduced into the 
market after the patent application was initially filed.
4 
•  The owner of a patent covering one feature in a complex product can use the threat of an 
injunction as a powerful weapon when bargaining over royalties with parties accused of 
infringement.
5 
•  Standard setting organizations face the continual threat of “patent ambush” by owners of 
patents that are essential to the standards they adopt.
6  
•  The way in which “willful” infringement is defined in practice gives patent holders 
additional bargaining power with alleged infringers who did not copy the patented 
technology.
7 
                                                 
2 The National Academies of Science (2004) emphasized the need to reinvigorate the non-obviousness standard.  In 
April 2007, in the KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. case, the Supreme Court issued a major ruling that defined what 
is “obvious,” and thus not patentable, more broadly than had the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.  
3 The Federal Trade Commission (2003) emphasized the problem of “questionable” patents, and the National 
Academies of Science (2004) made suggestions for improving patent quality.  Jaffe and Lerner (2004) also stress the 
problem of patent quality.  Lemley and Shapiro (2005) summarize some of the evidence regarding patent quality. 
4 In a key decision, Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867 (1988), the Federal Circuit stated: “It 
should be made clear at the outset of the present discussion that there is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in 
filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the 
market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product the 
applicant’s attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.”  Lemley and Moore (2004) 
discuss abuses involving continuation applications and report that over half of all litigated patents result from 
continuation applications.  Graham and Mowery (2004) and Hegde, et. al. (2007) provide extensive empirical 
evidence regarding the use of continuation applications. 
5 See, for example, Shapiro (2006b) and Lemley and Shapiro (2007). 
6 Examples include the FTC’s recent case against Rambus and a complex of cases involving Qualcomm.  See 
Farrell, et. al. (2007) for an extensive discussion of patent hold-up in the standard-setting context. 
7 Problems with the willfulness doctrine are discussed in Lemley and Tangri (2003). Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 3 
•  The concept of “reasonable royalties,” which is used to assess damages in some patent 
infringement cases, tends to yield excessive royalties in cases where the patent covers one 
minor feature in a complex product.
8 
Those who defend the current system, or are simply are cautious about reforming it, are naturally 
and justifiably concerned that reducing the rewards to patent holders will retard innovation, 
wounding the goose that lays the golden eggs of economic growth.  The burden of the argument 
therefore rests on those proposing reforms to show that any proposed changes will promote 
overall long-run economic efficiency, taking full account of their effects on innovation. 
The fundamental building block for the arguments made below is that economic efficiency is 
promoted when the rewards provided to patent holders are aligned with their actual social 
contributions.   Efficiency is not a monotonic function of the rewards provided to patent holders: 
excessive rewards, just like inadequate rewards, can reduce efficiency and stifle innovation.
9  
The patent reform proposals considered here attempt to rectify situations in which rewards to 
patent holders are likely to exceed their social contributions.  Reducing such excessive rewards 
promotes economic efficiency and encourages socially valuable innovation. 
Importantly, the two primary reform proposals considered here, expanding the independent 
invention defense and the use of re-examinations, would have highly targeted effects on specific 
types of patent holders.  They would not cause an across-the-board reduction in the rewards to 
patent holders generally.  In this respect, they are quite different from the classic instrument of 
patent policy traditionally studied by economists, namely patent length.  In theory, determining 
the optimal patent length requires an understanding of the relationship between the rewards 
provided to patent holders and the extent of inventive activity, i.e., that one have an estimate of 
                                                 
8 See Lemley and Shapiro (2007). 
9 As Joseph Stiglitz, then Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, testified at the FTC Hearings on Global 
and Innovation-Based Competition on October 12, 1995: “We often talk about how important patents are to promote 
innovation, because without patents, people don’t appropriate the returns to their innovation activity, and I certainly 
very strongly subscribe to that. The key importance of intellectual property rights is part of the mechanism that the 
market economy has to stimulate motivation. It was so important that it was included in the Constitution, so it gives 
you a sense of how important that is.  On the other hand, some people jump from that to the conclusion that the 
broader the patents rights are, the better it is for innovation, and that isn’t always correct, because we have an 
innovation system in which one innovation builds on another. If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, you 
may stifle competition that uses those patents later on, and so the breadth of utilization, maybe I should say, in a Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 4 
the elasticity of supply of inventions.  Estimating this elasticity is notoriously difficult.  
Moreover, there is enormous variation in the economic significance of different patents and in 
the costs and risks associated with discovering and developing different technologies.  Because 
the proposals studied here have targeted effects and only seek to bring the reward to patent 
holders closer in line with their social contributions, their attractiveness does not hinge on the 
elasticity of supply of inventions.
10  If a patent holder’s reward exceeds its social contribution, 
reducing its reward promotes economic efficiency, regardless of that elasticity.  
Nor do the proposals considered below rely on the ability of the PTO or the courts to distinguish 
among inventions based on their benefits, cost, or risk.  Rather, they are designed systematically 
and automatically to reduce the exclusionary powers of patent holders in cases where patent 
holders’ rewards predictably exceed their social contributions.  These reforms are feasible within 
the context of a unitary patent system (i.e., one that does not vary by field of technology), 
recognizing the very limited information about benefits, costs, and risks available to the PTO and 
the courts.  The welfare test for the proposals studied here is whether they promote economic 
efficiency regardless of the distribution of benefits, costs, and risk across patented inventions.  In 
the short run, i.e., after the invention has been achieved, reforms that reduce excessive rewards 
improve ex post efficiency.  More important, in the long run, to the extent that such reforms 
affect R&D and patenting decisions, efficiency is further improved. 
In Section II discusses, motivates, and elucidates the general concept of aligning private rewards 
with actual social contribution using patents.  A number of settings are identified in which 
patentees’ rewards tend to exceed their social contributions.  These general ideas are then applied 
in the subsequent sections.  Section III studies the impact of greatly expanding the independent 
invention defense in patent infringement cases.  Section IV considers the effects of enhancing the 
role of patent re-examinations.  Section V discusses the treatment of injunctions, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
broader sense, the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have 
adverse effects in the long run on innovation. We have to strike a balance.” 
10 Patent breadth, like patent length, is a relatively crude instrument for adjusting the rewards to patent holders.  
However, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990) studied the tradeoff between length and breadth in 
rewarding patent holders, which allows one to consider the optimal “shape” of patents, for any given level of total 
reward, again finessing the question of the elasticity of supply of inventions.  Tandon (1982) studied a similar Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 5 
determination of “reasonable royalties,” and the doctrine of willful infringement in patent 
infringement cases.  Section VI concludes. 
II.  Aligning Patentee Rewards and Contributions 
A natural starting point in thinking about the relationship between rewards and contributions 
using the patent system is to ask whether a patent holder’s reward should equal the social 
contribution resulting from its invention.  In other words, is “full appropriation” by the inventor 
of the social benefits resulting from its invention optimal?   To explore this question, we define 
the appropriability ratio as the ratio of the patent holder’s payoff to the social contribution 
associated with the patented invention.  Should the appropriability ratio equal unity? 
The idea that full appropriation is optimal is rooted in the basic economic concept of 
externalities: the activity of conducting R&D will be undersupplied if it generates positive 
externalities, and oversupplied if it creates negative externalities.  According to this reasoning, if 
an inventor can appropriate only a fraction of the social value generated by its invention, its 
R&D activities will be undersupplied.  Of course, the central goal of the patent system is to 
increase appropriability to spur innovation.  But this certainly does not imply that full 
appropriation is optimal, even if it is feasible. 
Perhaps due to its simplicity and intuitive appeal, the idea that the rewards to patent holders are 
too low if they fall short of the social contributions associated with their inventions has 
influenced innovation policy.  Combined with the empirical evidence that many inventions 
generate positive externalities, generally known as spillovers, the full appropriation intuition 
suggests that the patent system generally under-rewards innovators.
11  If one accepts this 
reasoning, reforms that reduce the rewards to patent holders seem ill advised.  
Full appropriation can indeed be shown to be optimal in a very specific setting with several very 
strong assumptions: if only a single firm is capable of pursuing the invention at issue, if the firm 
                                                                                                                                                             
tradeoff in providing rewards to innovators, but his analysis was cast in terms of compulsory licensing of patents 
rather than the scope of patent protection.   Gallini (1992) considers length vs. breath in the presence of imitation. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 6 
can be rewarded in a way that does not cause any inefficiency, e.g., through a monetary prize 
funded by non-distortionary taxes, and if the firm’s contribution can be accurately observed by 
the authority awarding the prize.  The Appendix contains two simple models along these lines.  
However, the reasoning behind this full appropriability result is not robust, and it certainly is not 
a reliable guide to patent policy, for several very important reasons that we now discuss. 
A. Multiple Firms Pursuing the Same Invention 
The full appropriability result, as usually conceived, breaks down rather dramatically once one 
considers inventions that can be pursued by multiple firms.  When multiple firms can pursue a 
given invention, granting a patent to the first successful firm and setting the patentee’s reward 
equal to the social contribution associated with the invention leads to wasteful duplication of 
effort, dissipating the social benefits of the invention.  This is true even if the patent monopoly 
does not cause any ex post deadweight loss.
12 
In their model of patent races, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) show that full appropriation causes a 
“common pool” problem, leading to excessive R&D expenditures that dissipate the social 
benefits of the invention.  Tandon (1983) obtains a similar result in a model in which multiple 
firms make risky R&D investments.  Tandon shows that the optimal degree of appropriability is 
smaller, the lower is the cost of pursuing the invention.  For “nearly obvious” inventions, i.e. 
inventions that can be achieved with high probability at modest cost, the optimal appropriability 
ratio is low, even before we account for the positive relationship between appropriability and 
deadweight loss.  The robust lesson from this line of research is that the optimal appropriation 
ratio is less than unity under a conventional patent system in which the first firm to achieve the 
invention receives a reward in the form of exclusive rights.
13 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 There is a sizeable literature attempting to measure the technological spillovers associated with innovations.  
Mansfield, et. al. (1977) and Griliches (1979) are classic references; Hall (1996) surveys this evidence. 
12 For a clear discussion of some of these issues, see Scotchmer (2004), especially Chapter 4, “On the Optimal 
Design of Intellectual Property.” 
13 In general, if a patent is to be awarded to a single firm, the optimal appropriation ratio, while less than unity, 
depends in a complex way on the distribution of firms’ costs of pursuing the invention, the likelihood of successful 
invention by the various firms, and the relationship between the patent holder’s reward and deadweight loss.  None 
of these variables is observable in practice. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 7 
Why does the basic “externality” intuition fail so badly when multiple firms are pursuing the 
same invention?  What is wrong with rewarding the full social contribution associated with the 
invention to the first inventor?  Answering this question requires that one distinguish between the 
social contribution associated with the availability of the invention and the social contribution of 
any given inventor.  If only one party can pursue the invention, this distinction evaporates, and 
the full appropriation intuition is valid.  However, if two or more parties can achieve the 
invention independently, this distinction becomes very substantial indeed. 
Consider the polar case in which two parties achieve the same invention at precisely the same 
time.  Under a conventional patent system, the social contribution associated with the invention 
is the same as if just one party had achieved the invention at that time: the invention is available 
to society but controlled by a single party .  Strikingly, however, each inventor’s social 
contribution in this case is nil: the invention would have been available to society even if that 
inventor had not discovered the invention.
14  Any positive award to either inventor will exceed 
that party’s incremental social contribution.  Taking seriously the notion of rewarding inventors 
based on their incremental contributions would suggest a very different system, under which the 
invention is placed in the public domain once it has been discovered independently by two or 
more parties.  Such a system may be unfamiliar, and even appear strange, but it would in fact be 
faithful to the idea of aligning each inventor’s rewards with its incremental social contribution.
15 
No, this paper is not actually proposing replacing the current patent system with one that awards 
a patent to the first inventor, with the life of the patent extending only until the date of 
subsequent invention, at which time the invention is placed in the public domain.  The goal here 
is more modest: to establish that allowing the first inventor to appropriate a significant share of 
the social benefits associated with its invention can greatly over-reward the first inventor in 
                                                 
14 Each party’s incremental social contribution is nil if the two parties achieve the very same invention.  In practice, 
different parties may make slightly different discoveries.  The logic provided here suggests the virtues of a system 
that rewards each for its distinctive contribution, but not for any common elements. 
15 Such a system would not generally be optimal, since it would not provide sufficient rewards to independent 
second inventors: their social contribution would be positive (the elimination of the monopoly deadweight loss that 
occurs when the invention is placed in the public domain), but they would not be fully rewarded for these 
contributions.  Shapiro (2006a) shows that optimality requires that the ratio of profits to contribution for the first 
inventor equal the ratio of profits to contribution for the second inventor. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 8 
situations where subsequent independent invention occurs.  Using the standard definition of the 
appropriability ratio given above, the optimal appropriability ratio with independent invention 
can be very low.  This reflects the fact that the contribution of any one inventor is a small 
fraction of the contribution associated with the invention.  
This powerful economic point will be central in Section III below when we consider the 
economic effects of expanding the independent invention defense: such a defense only arises in 
the event that two or more parties independently discover the same invention.  Multiple 
independent invention is most likely in situations where the underlying knowledge base in the 
public domain is advancing rapidly, so many incremental improvements are “in the air.”  It is no 
coincidence that this  appears to be common today in the information technology and 
biotechnology sectors, the very sectors where the call for patent reform is greatest.  Multiple 
independent discovery also is most likely for inventions with a high benefit to cost ratio, which 
includes inventions that are easily achieved, i.e., close to the boundary of being “obvious.”  
B. The Public Good Aspect of Patent Challenges 
We now consider the relationship between reward and contribution for a probabilistic patent, i.e., 
a patent that may be invalid because the patent holder did not in fact contribute a novel, non-
obvious invention to society.  As emphasized by Lemley and Shapiro (2005) among others, 
patents are invariably probabilistic when they are issued, and there is considerable evidence that 
a large number of issued patents are weak.  Following Farrell and Shapiro (2007), we identify 
circumstances in which the owner of a probabilistic patent can obtain a reward that exceeds its 
social contribution.  Accounting for the fact that the PTO often fails to find relevant prior art, a 
class of situations can be identified in which patentees’ rewards exceed their contributions. 
What is the social contribution of a party that obtains a probabilistic patent, i.e., a patent that 
might be invalidated if a more thorough search for prior art is conducted through re-examination 
or litigation?  Farrell and Shapiro (2007) show conceptually how to measure the contribution 
associated with a probabilistic patent that is licensed and not tested by litigation or re-
examination.  As usual, social contribution is the difference between realized total welfare and 
the welfare that would have resulted in the absence of the patent holder.   The key is to recognize 
that, if not for the patent holder, two outcomes might have arisen.  If the patent holder truly did Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 9 
cause the patented technology to be available to society, i.e., if the patented technology is novel 
and non-obvious, then without the patent holder the patented technology would not be available 
to society.
16  Alternatively, if the patented technology is not novel, or is obvious, then without 
the patent holder the patented technology would be available and in the public domain.  The 
former case corresponds to the situation normally studied, in which the patent is surely valid and 
the patent holder’s social contribution is clearly positive.  In the latter case, however, the patent 
holder’s social contribution is actually negative, namely the deadweight loss associated with the 
patent monopoly: while inventing nothing, the patent holder has obtained exclusive rights to a 
technology that would otherwise have been in the public domain. 
Applying this conceptual framework, Farrell and Shapiro (2007) study in detail the case of a 
patent holder who licenses its probabilistic patent to a downstream oligopolistic industry.  They 
consider a patented technology which reduces the marginal cost of producing downstream 
products by v, the “value” of the patented technology.
17  They show that the patent holder’s 
profits exceed its social contribution if the running royalty rate exceeds the expected cost saving 
attributable to the patent holder, i.e., the value of the patented technology discounted by the 
patent strength.
18  For example, if the patented technology reduces costs by $10 per unit, and if 
the patent is valid with 30% probability, then the patent holder’s profits exceed its contribution if 
the running royalty rate exceeds $3 per unit.   The Appendix derives this intuitive benchmark in 
the important special case where the downstream market is perfectly competitive.    
Farrell and Shapiro (2007) then identify circumstances under which owners of weak patents can 
indeed obtain per-unit royalties in excess of the benchmark level.
19  This is not possible for 
ironclad patents: if the owner of an ironclad patent tried to charge a running royalty greater than 
the value of the patented technology, potential licensees would just say “no” and refrain from 
                                                 
16 In contrast to the discussion in Section II.A above, we assume here that if the patented technology is novel and 
non-obvious, no other entity would have discovered the patented technology, had the patent holder not done so.  
17 Their analysis easily extends to the case where the patented technology adds value v to the downstream product. 
18 See Theorem 3 in Farrell and Shapiro (2007).  The theorem relies on the mild assumption that per-unit royalties 
are passed through in a linear or concave manner to downstream prices.  
19 Their welfare analysis is sharply different from that in Anton and Yao (2006), who implicitly credit the patent 
holder with the invention at issue in their analysis of the implications of weak patent rights. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 10 
using the patented technology.  Likewise, potential customers would purchase substitute, non-
infringing products.  But this logic does not extend to probabilistic patents.  How will a potential 
licensee respond if the patented technology reduces costs by $10 per unit, if the patent is valid 
with 30% probability, and if the patent holder offers to license the patent for, say, $6 per unit, 
twice the $3 benchmark level?   The potential licensee faced with such an offer will not simply 
refrain from using the patented technology: better to pay a royalty of $6 per unit than forego the 
$10 per unit value of the patented technology.   The key question, then, is whether the potential 
licensee will find it more profitable to pay $6 per unit or to infringe and face the prospect of 
being sued for infringement. 
What are the benefits and costs of licensing vs. litigation from the perspective of a single 
technology user?  Under U.S. patent law, any one technology user who challenges the patent is 
providing a public good for other technology users: if the patent is invalidated, other technology 
users benefit because they too can then use the (formerly) patented technology freely.
20  As 
emphasized by Farrell and Merges (2004) and Miller (2004), this means that any one firm 
challenging a patent is providing a public good to other technology users and to consumers who 
purchase products that use the patented technology.  As usual, the market under-supplies public 
goods, in this case patent challenges.   
Farrell and Shapiro (2007) show how owners of weak patents can exploit the public good nature 
of patent challenges to obtain royalties in excess of their social contributions.  These excess 
rewards occur if the patent holder is licensing to multiple downstream firms that compete against 
each other.  In this situation, the owner of a weak patent can obtain a surprising high per-unit 
royalty rate in the licensing equilibrium.  The key driver here, emphasized in Farrell and Merges 
(2004), is “relativity.”  Since the downstream firms compete against each other, the profits of any 
one downstream firm are sensitive to that firm’s costs relative to the others.  In the licensing 
equilibrium, a single firm that challenges the patent and loses places itself at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to its rivals who signed licenses.  But a single downstream firm that 
                                                 
20 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that if one challenger to a patent prevails on patent invalidity, other users can 
rely on this result and therefore need not pay royalties, even if they had previously agreed to do so.  See Blonder-
Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).  Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 11 
challenges the patent and wins does not enjoy a competitive advantage relative to its rivals who 
signed licenses, since in that event all downstream firms are relieved of the duty to pay 
royalties.
21  These results are derived in a model with zero litigation costs; they become even 
stronger if litigation costs give additional bargaining power to patent holders.
22 
This analysis will be highly relevant in Section IV below where we consider the benefits of 
improving and expanding patent re-examinations.  In fact, Farrell and Shapiro (2007) derive 
expressions for the benefits of enhanced re-examination prior to licensing.
23  One of their 
findings is that these benefits can be large for patents of intermediate strength that are licensed to 
multiple downstream rivals, but small (or even negative) for patents licensed to downstream 
firms that do not compete against each other.
24 
C. Specific Investments and Patent Hold-Up 
Another important situation in which patent holders may be able to capture more than their social 
contribution arises if they can act opportunistically, appropriating a portion of the investments 
made by others that are specific to the patented technology.  Such opportunism can easily arise 
when technology users make such specific investments before they negotiate the terms of a 
patent license, perhaps because they are unaware of the (pending or actual) patent at the time 
these investments are made, or because the patent is broad and vague, or because of other 
obstacles to negotiating and signing licenses at such an early stage in product development. 
                                                 
21 Farrell and Shapiro (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the issues that arise in this context, including the 
possibility that the downstream firms will coordinate their efforts to challenge the patent.  Their analysis assumes 
that the patent holder has a credible threat to litigate against a single downstream firm that does not sign a license 
and infringes.  Further work is needed to integrate the forces of relativity and litigation credibility. 
22 The gap between the patent holder’s profits and its social contribution for weak patents is further increased if it is 
feasible for the patent holder to license its patent using two-part tariffs that include negative fixed fees.  In that case,  
the patent owner can construct a set of patent licenses that raise joint profits by supporting a hub-and-spoke cartel 
among the downstream firms.  The patent holder makes a fixed payment to each downstream firm to induce it to 
sign a license rather than challenge the patent. 
23 Their analysis is also relevant to assessing the benefits of improving patent quality by examining patent 
applications more closely before patents are issued.  However, we apply these ideas to re-examinations, since it 
would not be practical to greatly expand examination of all patent applications, as emphasized by Lemley (2001).   
24 All of these results are obtained without any specific investments and patent hold-up. As discussed immediately 
below, patent hold-up provides a distinct reason why re-examinations can generate significant social benefits. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 12 
The economics of opportunism are well understood, and there is nothing at all exceptional about 
applying these ideas to patent licensing.
25  To illustrate the basic idea, consider a manufacturer 
that is designing its product and the holder of a patent covering technology that adds value to the 
product.  Suppose the manufacturer is considering two product designs.  Design A uses the 
patented technology; if the product is made using Design A, it will command a price of $120.  
Design B does not use the patented technology; if the product is made using Design B, it will 
command a price of only $100.  All production costs are the same for both designs.  Thus, the 
contribution of the patented technology is $20, namely the value it adds to the product. 
Suppose that the manufacturer must incur certain costs to design its product.  Either of the two 
designs requires the manufacturer to incur $30 in costs that are common to the two designs.  
Each design also involves $40 in design-specific costs.  The patent holder and the manufacturer 
bargain over royalties; for simplicity suppose that they have equal bargaining skill, so they split 
equally any gains from trade.  Suppose that the patent is ironclad and the manufacturer is 
prohibited from selling products using Design A if it lacks a license to the patented technology.   
If the two parties bargain before the manufacturer has incurred any design costs, the negotiated 
royalty will equal $10, since the patented technology is worth $20, and these gains from trade are 
split equally.  The appropriability ratio is 50% ($10/$20).  However, if the two parties bargain 
after the manufacturer has incurred the costs associated with Design A, the negotiated royalty 
will equal $30.  Why?  The gains from trade in this situation are $60: the $20 in inherent value 
associated with the patented technology plus the $40 of design-specific costs that will be wasted 
if the two parties cannot agree on licensing terms and the manufacturer is forced to revert to 
Design B.  Intuitively, the manufacturer is in a weak bargaining position after it incurs $40 in 
costs specific to Design A.  The appropriability ratio is now 150% ($30/$20).
26  As a general 
proposition, if a technology user negotiates over royalties with a patent owner after the user has 
incurred costs that are specific to the patented technology, the reward to the patent holder can 
exceed its contribution.  In practice, a key question is whether the patent system provides a 
                                                 
25 See Shapiro (2006b) and Farrell, et. al. (2007) for simple models of patent hold-up.  Shapiro considers 
probabilistic patents; Farrell, et. al. consider a patent that is known to be valid. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 13 
mechanism whereby technology users can avoid placing themselves in this situation.  For an 
ironclad patent, this turns on whether the manufacturer is aware of the patent at the time it 
designs its product.  Such awareness may be impossible if the patent application has not yet been 
published, and very difficult for questionable patents and for patents with broad and vague 
claims.  This point will be very important in Section III below when we consider an independent 
invention defense for those who practice the invention before it is disclosed by the patentee. 
Concerns about patent hold-up are by no means simply theoretical.  They are very real in many 
patent infringement cases, where licensing takes place in the shadow of litigation that may lead 
to an injunction preventing the manufacturer from selling products that have an infringing 
component.  Concerns about patent hold-up are sometimes expressed colorfully in terms of so-
called “patent trolls,” who allegedly extract excessive royalties by threatening to obtain 
injunctions preventing infringing firms from selling complex products to which the patented 
technology contributes only a small fraction of the value.
27 
Shapiro (2006b) extends the analysis of patent hold-up to probabilistic patents.  He shows how 
the rewards to owners of probabilistic patents can exceed the normative benchmark (discussed 
above) when these patent holders can threaten to obtain permanent injunctions.
28  The danger of 
excessive rewards to patentees is most pronounced if the patented technology covers a relatively 
small component of a complex product containing many other innovative features, and where 
redesigning the product to avoid infringing would involve significant costs and/or time.  Patent 
hold-up problems also depend upon patent strength, i.e., the probability that the patent will be 
held valid and infringed if litigated.  Returns above the benchmark level are especially likely for 
weak patents.  In fact, a weak patent can garner excessive returns even if the manufacturer is 
aware of it prior to making any product design decisions or specific investments.  This analysis 
will be central in Section V.A when we consider the rules governing permanent injunctions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 If the patent holder has all of the bargaining power, the appropriation ratio without hold-up would be 100% 
($20/$20) and with hold-up it would be 300% ($60/$20). 
27 See Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Shapiro (2006b).  The problem of patent hold-up can be especially severe in a 
standard-setting context, as discussed in Farrell, et. al. (2007).  Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 14 
The patent hold-up problem is one of timing: technology users must make product design and 
decisions and make specific investments either (a) before they are aware of a patent that may be 
asserted against them, or (b) before they can resolve whether the patent is valid and/or whether 
their product would indeed infringe the patent (perhaps because the claims are broad and vague).  
These problems can be reduced or eliminated if the patent’s validity and scope can be 
determined sooner rather than later.  This observation will be directly relevant in Section IV 
when we consider the benefits of improving patent re-examination procedures.  Such procedures 
hold out the promise of providing substantial information about patent validity and scope sooner, 
and at less expense, than is possible through patent litigation.   Critically, they also allow 
potential infringers, rather than patent holders, to influence or control the date at which the patent 
is tested more carefully than it was during the initial examination. 
D. Multiple Firms Pursuing Complementary Innovations 
We now consider the common circumstance in which a number of firms are pursuing 
complementary innovations.   Our central point here is that rewarding any one innovator with the 
full incremental value of its invention typically is not desirable because doing so will reduce the 
reward available to other complementary innovators. 
To illustrate the basic economic issues that arise with complementary innovations, consider two 
parties who are pursuing innovations that are technical complements.
29  Suppose that the social 
value created if both inventions are discovered is  B V , the social value created if just invention #1 
is discovered is  1 V , and likewise for invention #2 and  2 V .   The concept of technical 
complementarily is captured by the inequality  12 B VV V >+.  Write  12 () B SV VV ≡ −+ for the 
“synergy” between the two inventions, i.e., the added value from combining them.   
                                                                                                                                                             
28 The availability of preliminary injunctions also can tilt bargaining power in favor of the patent holder and lead to 
excessive returns, but they are rarely issued.  See Armond (2003) for an extensive discussion of the independent 
invention defense in situations where patent holders seek preliminary injunctions. 
29 To steer clear of the issues raised above regarding independent invention of any single invention, we assume here 
that each of these firms is uniquely capable of achieving its respective invention. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 15 
Examples of complementary innovations abound, especially in the information technology 
sector, where multiple innovations are routinely combined to produce a single product or system.  
For example, if invention #1 is a faster microprocessor and invention #2 is improved power 
management, together, these two innovations complement each other in improving the 
performance of laptop computers.  Improvements in wireless Internet access would further 
complement these two innovations.  As a numerical example, suppose invention #1 alone adds 
value  1 $50 V =  to a laptop, invention #2 alone adds value  2 $10 V = , and together they add value 
$80 B V = .  The amount of the synergy is therefore  $80 ($50 $10) $20 S = −+= . 
As is well known in other contexts, in the presence of complements the sum of incremental 
contributions exceeds the total contribution.  Here, if both inventions are discovered, the 
incremental contribution of invention #1 is  2 B VV −  and the incremental contribution of invention 
#2 is  1 B VV − .  In our numerical example, the incremental value of invention #1, given success 
with invention #2 is  2 $80 $10 $70 B VV − =−=, and the incremental value of invention #2, given 
success with invention #1 is  1 $80 $50 $30 B VV −= − = .   In general, the sum of the two 
incremental contributions is  12 2( ) B VV V −+ which equals  B VS + .  In our numerical example, the 
sum of the incremental values is $70 $30 $100 + = , which exceeds the total value of $80 by the 
amount of the synergy, namely $20.  In general, it is simply not feasible for each patent holder to 
receive its full incremental contribution unless the firms are subsidized by the amount S .  We 
assume no such subsidies are available. 
Under a patent system (as opposed to a system of public subsidies for R&D), in the presence of 
complementary innovations, there is a very real danger that establishing patent rights that give a 
greater return to one innovator will reduce the return to another, complementary innovator, and 
thus reduce the likelihood that the synergies will in fact be achieved (since they require two or 
more innovations to be made successfully).  If the rewards are not spread properly across the 
different innovators, providing a greater return to one innovator can easily reduce overall 
innovation and impair long-run economic efficiency.   This danger is especially great if one 
innovator is in a position to capture its full incremental contribution, or even more, perhaps 
because it has a first-mover advantage or can engage in opportunistic behavior. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 16 
As shown in the Appendix, the optimal way to divide up the amount of the synergy between the 
two innovators, in the event both succeed, depends upon the elasticity of one innovator’s 
probability of successful invention, with respect to the portion of  the synergy it captures, relative 
to the other’s elasticity.
30  These elasticities typically will be very difficult to observe, although 
we do know that the fraction of the synergy allocated to a firm should be very small if that firm 
can achieve its invention with high probability at low cost, which tends to correspond to the 
notion of an “obvious” or nearly obvious technology.   The central point here is that two or more 
innovators cannot both receive their incremental contributions; synergies must be shared, which 
implies partial appropriability for each.  If many parties must make investments that provide 
complementary inputs, the resulting synergies may need to be shared among many parties.
31 
This analysis should serve as a stark reminder that the benchmark of full appropriability is 
simply not feasible in practice when multiple, complementary innovations are involved.  Policies 
that spread out the available rewards among parties contributing complementary innovations are 
generally desirable. Arguments by any one patent holder that it should receive its full 
incremental contribution are incomplete in the presence of multiple, complementary innovations.  
Any system under which one or a few parties can appropriate a large share of these synergies is 
likely to be inefficient, leading to less innovation than would be possible under a more balanced 
system.  This is especially true if the party capturing a large share of the synergies does not have 
a high elasticity of success with respect to its share of the synergies, or it that party captures 
more than its incremental value, perhaps for the one of the reasons discussed above. 
In applying these ideas, it is important to recognize that innovative activities go far beyond the 
stage of research and invention, and many types of innovation does not involve patents at all.  
Significant risky investments may be required to develop the resulting invention into a workable 
product; to refine and test different designs; to assemble various complementary assets; and to 
make investments in manufacturing and marketing that are specific to the resulting product.  All 
                                                 
30 This idea is a close cousin of the classic Ramsey pricing analysis, where fixed costs are most efficiently covered 
with markups on goods with relatively inelastic demand.  These ideas are standard in optimal taxation theory.  
31 Gilbert and Katz (2007) discuss how best to divide up the total payoff between firms engaging in R&D in the 
polar case where no value is created until all of a fixed number of inventions are achieved.  Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 17 
of these complementary activities are part of the process of innovation, and all may be necessary 
before an invention can lead to economic benefits.   
The discussion here has been cast in terms of innovations that complement each other but do not 
build upon each other.  Very similar issues arise in the equally important context of cumulative 
innovation.  Cumulative innovations also are complementary, but follow a somewhat different 
logic than used above.  In the pure case of cumulative innovation, innovation #2 cannot be 
discovered unless and until innovation #1 is discovered.  The incremental value of innovation #1 
is  1 V  without  innovation #2 and  B V  with innovation #2, much as it was above if  2 0 V = .  But 
innovation #2 cannot even be contemplated unless and until innovation #1 has been achieved, 
which is different from the situation treated above (although similar to that case with  2 0 V = ). 
Once innovation #1 has been achieved, the incremental value of innovation #2 is   1 B VV − .  The 
sum of the incremental contributions in the event that both innovations are successful is 
1 () B B V VV − + , which exceeds the total value,  B V  by the amount of the synergy,  1 B SV V =− .  
As in the case of complementary innovations that do not build upon each other, a patent system 
without subsidies cannot reward each innovator with its incremental contribution if both succeed. 
There is a substantial literature on optimal reward systems with cumulative innovation.  
Scotchmer (2004) provides a valuable discussion of the tricky problems that arise in this context; 
she focuses on the role of patent breadth and the required inventive step.
32  One idea in this 
literature, going back at least to Kitch (1977), is that well-defined property rights combined with 
full appropriation can lead to efficient innovation incentives.  However, this argument relies on 
some very strong and unrealistic assumptions: that the various potential innovators can sign 
contracts before they incur the costs associated with innovating, and that the transaction costs 
associated with such contracts are minimal.
33  These conditions are very unlikely to be met in 
cases of cumulative innovation or in situations where many parties are engaged in simultaneous 
complementary innovative activities, especially where these activities involve considerable 
                                                 
32 See especially Chapter 5, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Protecting Cumulative Innovation” and the 
references provided there. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 18 
uncertainty about technical outcomes and where patents are probabilistic and contain broad and 
vague claims.  The more recent literature has emphasized the need to spread out the available 
rewards among multiple innovators; see especially Hopenhayn, et. al. (2006).  Bessen and 
Maskin (2006) establish conditions under which patents actually retard cumulative innovation. 
The idea that full appropriation by one innovator may come at the expense of other innovators, 
and thus is not optimal in the presence of complementary innovations, is generally relevant to 
any discussion of the optimal appropriation ratio.  This idea will be especially important in 
Section V when we discuss injunctions, the determination of reasonable royalties, and the 
doctrine of willful infringement. 
E. Deadweight Loss from Patent Monopoly 
The full appropriability result breaks down for another important reason when applied to the 
patent system as opposed to a prize system.  As shown in the Appendix, the patent holder’s 
reward should generally be less than its social contribution if the act of giving the reward 
generates deadweight loss.  This will typically be the case when the reward comes in the form of 
a patent, which grants exclusionary rights, rather than in the form of a monetary prize.
34  So long 
as a patent causes deadweight loss, the optimal appropriation ratio is less than unity.  While we 
do not rely directly on this result below when we consider specific reforms to the patent system, 
it is well to bear this point in mind when discussing private rewards using the patent system. 
F. Summary 
The idea that innovation is best encouraged by equating the rewards to patent holders with their 
social contributions is alluring and often correct.  But it is critical not to confuse this idea with 
the sharply different, and incorrect, idea that patent holders’ rewards should be equated with the 
social contributions of the technologies that they patent.   Such rewards are often excessive. 
                                                                                                                                                             
33 Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) emphasize that the optimal design of intellectual property in the context of 
cumulative innovation hinges on the effectiveness of such ex ante contracting.  
34 An exception would arise if the patent holder could engage in perfect price discrimination.  While this is a useful 
theoretical benchmark, it is not a reasonable assumption in practice, especially when one recognizes that the 
deadweight loss associated with a patent comes not just from higher prices, which discourage usage of the invention, Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 19 
When multiple firms independently achieve the same or similar inventions, each firm’s social 
contribution is far less than the social contribution associated with the availability of the patented 
technology.  For probabilistic patents, the patent holder’s social contribution is only equal to the 
social contribution associated with the patented technology in the event that the patent is valid, 
i.e., in the event that the patented technology truly is novel and non-obvious.  Plus, when 
multiple firms pursue complementary inventions, as frequently occurs in the information 
technology and biotechnology fields and is the norm in the context of cumulative innovation, it is 
simply not feasible, using a decentralized patent system, to reward each firm with the 
incremental contribution associated with the technology that it patents.  Under the optimal patent 
reward system, all innovators appropriate their social contribution partially, not fully. 
For all of these reasons, a patent system that allows patent holders to fully appropriate the social 
benefits associated with the technologies that they patent will tend to over-reward patent holders 
and thus retard innovation in comparison with a more carefully designed system that reduces or 
eliminates such excessive rewards. We now consider a number of reforms to the patent system 
that have a targeted incidence, systematically reducing excessive rewards to patent holders, not 
all rewards to patent holders.  These reforms are attractive regardless of the elasticity of supply 
of inventions. 
III. Independent Invention Defense 
Under U.S. patent law, if two or more parties achieve the same invention at nearly the same time, 
the first party to invent typically is awarded the patent and has the right to sue the other party for 
patent infringement if it practices the invention.
35  Disputes over priority are handled through 
interference actions at the PTO.
36  Once the patent is assigned, a party accused of infringement 
cannot avoid liability by establishing that it independently invented the technology covered by 
                                                                                                                                                             
but also from the reduced incentives of third parties to develop complementary innovations and improvements that 
build on the patented invention. 
35 Congress is currently considering proposals to shift from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, which is 
used elsewhere in the world.  The presence and nature of an independent invention defense is logically separate from 
the rule establishing invention priority.  Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 20 
the patent.  There is no independent invention defense.  Under a full-fledged independent 
invention defense, the first inventor would still receive a patent, and could sue anyone who is 
practicing the invention for patent infringement, but any party sued for infringement would have 
the right to use the patented technology freely if it could establish that it independently invented 
the same technology .  Would introducing such a defense promote economic efficiency? 
Introducing an independent invention defense into U.S. patent law would be a very significant 
change, precisely because so many patented technologies are in fact discovered independently by 
more than one party.  Historically, many pioneering inventions were discovered at nearly the 
same time by more than one party, including the telegraph (Morse and Alter), the light bulb 
(Edison and Swan), the telephone (Bell and Gray), and the integrated circuit (Kilby and 
Noyce).
37  Independent invention may be even more common for incremental innovations, 
especially in rapidly advancing fields such as information technology and biotechnology, where 
many applied ideas flowing from basic research are “in the air” at any given time.  Plus, the more 
narrowly the notion of “obviousness” is defined, the easier it is for one party to obtain a patent 
on an incremental innovation that other parties are achieving at the same time. 
To fix ideas, consider the following basic fact pattern.  Party A achieves an invention first and 
files for a patent.  Party B achieves the invention second, but entirely independently of Party A.  
Under U.S. patent law, the patent is awarded to Party A, assuming its invention otherwise 
qualifies for patentability.  Armed with its patent, Party A can prevent Party B from practicing 
the invention.  Independent second inventors come up empty handed.   With an independent 
invention defense, Party A would still obtain the patent, but Party B would have the right to use 
the patented technology free of charge. 
A. Efficiency Effects 
How would an independent invention defense affect economic efficiency?  In particular, how 
would the defense affect the alignment between reward and contribution?  
                                                                                                                                                             
36 See Cohen and Ishii (2005) for a study of interference actions at the PTO.  They find that interferences are highly 
concentrated among chemical and biomedical firms. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 21 
Begin with Party A, the first inventor.  Based on the discussion in Section II.A about multiple 
independent invention, it should be clear that the defense would generally bring Party A’s reward 
closer in line with its contribution.  Party A’s contribution includes achieving the invention 
before Party B; with the defense in place, Party A would still be rewarded with exclusive rights 
during this interim period.  Party A’s social contribution clearly does not include Party B’s use of 
the invention.  Since Party A retains the patent and can exclude others, i.e., the invention is not 
placed in the public domain after multiple independent discovery, there are good reasons to 
believe that Party A’s rewards will remain excessive even with the defense in place.  Offsetting 
this are possible spillovers attributable to Party A, such as follow-on non-infringing innovations 
that are spurred by the Party A’s patent disclosure.  However, many of these disclosure 
spillovers, as well as other spillovers arising from reverse engineering or the leakage of know-
how, may not be attributable to Party A; with the defense in place, they would also result from 
Party B practicing the invention.  Unless the spillovers specific to Party A are quite large, Party 
A’s reward will still be excessive even with the defense in place, since Party A retains the ability 
to sue others for patent infringement even after Party B’s independent invention. 
What about Party B?  With the defense in place, Party B makes a real social contribution by 
converting the patent monopoly into a patent duopoly.   Party B’s rewards are increased by its 
ability to invoke the defense, but not to the point that they are excessive.  Party B simply has the 
right to use the invention it discovered independently, in competition with Party A.   To the 
extent that there are spillovers specific to Party B’s invention, raising Party B’s reward moves it 
closer to Party B’s contribution, without granting Party B any exclusionary rights.  Such a shift 
must have a beneficial effect on innovation incentives. 
Several recent papers have used these and related ideas to study the efficiency effects of an 
independent invention defense in formal models.  The starting point for welfare analysis is the 
observation that the defense has no effect in the absence of independent invention, and it has 
desirable ex post efficiency effects in the event that multiple invention does occur, because it 
                                                                                                                                                             
37 Merton (1957) is a classic reference on the frequency of multiple discovery in science.  See Lamb and Easton 
(1984) for an in-depth treatment of multiple discoveries in the sciences. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 22 
establishes a duopoly rather than a monopoly in the use of the patented technology.
38  By 
immunizing Party B from charges of patent infringement, the use of the patented technology is 
promoted and the deadweight loss associated with the patent is reduced.   An additional ex post 
benefit arises in cases where Parties A and B would sign a license without the defense: the 
defense reduces or eliminate the transactions costs of licensing between Parties A and B. 
The larger question is how the defense affects innovation incentives.  The effects of the defense 
on innovation are captured in different ways in different formal models, but the idea that the 
defense promotes innovation and long-run economic efficiency is robust.  In cases where the two 
inventors are not actual or potential competitors, the defense actually increases  the expected 
rewards to innovation.  If neither party can predict in advance whether it will be the first or 
second inventor, the shifting of rents from the first inventor to the second inventor that the 
defense causes will have no effect at all on their innovation incentives.  Since the defense 
generates some ex post benefits by reducing transaction costs and by eliminating distortions 
associated with running royalties, it increases both parties’ expected rewards.  
The analysis is more complex in situations where Parties A and B are actual or potential 
competitors, because the defense causes additional ex post competition in such cases.  
Nonetheless, the defense robustly improves ex ante incentives, better aligning private reward and 
social contribution.  The most straightforward case arises if the parties’ expected rewards without 
the defense are greater than their expected social contributions.  We observed above in Section 
II.A that this is the norm when multiple firms race to obtain a patent.  In this case, the 
independent invention defense has favorable ex ante as well as ex post effects.  Maurer and 
Scotchmer (2002) make this point using a static model with free entry in which each firm, by 
paying a fixed amount, can discover the invention with certainty.  In their model, all R&D 
expenditures by multiple firms are entirely duplicative, and the market equilibrium involves 
excessive entry by rent-seeking firms.  The independent invention defense helps correct the 
common pool problem identified in Section II.A above. 
                                                 
38 The duopoly is not symmetric: only the patent holder has the right to sue others for patent infringement and the 
right to grant licenses to others to use the patented technology.  Establishing an independent invention defense thus 
leads to a different system from the one in which the second inventor shares the patent and has licensing rights. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 23 
The attractiveness of the independent invention defense is not, however, confined to situations in 
which the rewards to patent holders under the conventional patent system exceed their social 
contributions.  With sufficiently large spillovers that are specific to individual innovators, a 
patentee’s reward can, in theory, fall short of its contribution, even with subsequent independent 
invention.  Large, inventor-specific spillovers may not be common.  However, to address this 
possibility, Shapiro (2006a) develops a model in which the appropriability ratio can be low. 
In the model studied by Shapiro (2006a), it is efficient for multiple parties to pursue the 
invention in question due to uncertainty, diminishing returns to investment by each party, and the 
benefits associated with a diversity of approaches taken by multiple parties.  He studies optimal 
patent policy where patent length and the availability of an independent invention defense are 
patent system design variables.  In his model, the independent invention defense enhances long-
run economic efficiency, even in the presence of large spillovers that are specific to Party A or 
Party B, regardless of the elasticity of supply of inventions.  He shows that an independent 
invention defense is optimal under the mild condition that the ratio of deadweight loss to profits 
is higher under monopoly than under duopoly.  So long as this condition is met, any given 
reward to successful innovation can be provided more efficiently using a longer patent lifetime 
combined with the independent invention defense, rather than a shorter patent lifetime without 
the defense.
39  By an extension of his logic, adding an independent invention defense to the 
current system enhances efficiency, holding fixed the patent lifetime, if the patent lifetime has 
been set optimally.
40   Shapiro also shows that the defense has superior properties in terms of the 
social portfolio of innovative projects pursued by private parties, because the defense better 
aligns the relative private and social rewards in the event of single vs. multiple invention. 
In a model with free entry in which the firms do not choose their R&D investment levels, La 
Manna, et. al. (1989) establish conditions under which a “permissive” patent regime, under 
which all independent inventors have the right to practice the invention so long as they invent 
within a specified time period after the first inventor, is optimal.  Henry (2007) develops a model 
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of “runner-up patents” in which a second inventor can freely use the patented technology if the 
time lag between invention by the first party and invention by the second party does not exceed 
some specified length.  In his model, each party chooses its R&D investment level.  He provides 
conditions under which such runner-up patents are desirable and argues that the maximum time 
lag during which runner-up patents would be issued should become a new patent policy tool.  
As noted by Shapiro (2006a), one tricky issue surrounding the defense is that it could cause some 
inventors to adopt trade secret rather than patent protection, because an inventor who keeps its 
invention secret could subsequently invoke the defense if a patent is later issued to another party 
for the same invention.  From a social perspective, this does not seem to present a problem in 
cases where the technology is in fact subsequently patented: in those cases, society still receives 
the benefit of the patent disclosure, along with the benefits of some competition in the use of the 
technology.  Some social costs could arise in cases where the technology remains a secret for an 
extended period of time; those costs would need to be balanced against the various benefits of 
the defense discussed above.
41 
Establishing an independent invention defense would likely have salutary effects on the 
patenting decisions by firms, especially in areas where patent quality is most problematic.  Under 
the current system, a party that receives a patent covering a technology that is independently 
developed by others can receive a very substantial reward, especially if it can use the patent 
opportunistically.  The system therefore provides rewards to parties who are most aggressive in 
seeking patents on inventions that might be obvious and/or in the public domain.  The defense 
would systematically reduce the rewards associated with such patents, while having no effect on 
inventors who uniquely make pioneering discoveries.  The defense thus might help counteract 
the vicious cycle by which patents become easier to get, causing an increase in the number of 
patent applications, putting more pressure on the PTO, making patents even easier to get. 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 To be precise, introducing some version of the defense is optimal, and introducing the full-fledged defense is 
optimal up to a first order approximation, which will be good if the defense does not represent a large, discrete 
change in the expected rewards to innovators who are creating significant inventor-specific spillovers. 
41 The social vs. private incentive to rely on trade secrets vs. patents depends heavily on the importance of the 
disclosure function of patents.  Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) study the choice between trade secret and patent 
protection in a model where a second party can patent an invention that is known to have been invented previously 
but kept secret.  Anton and Yao (2004) study the choice between patent and trade secret protection. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 25 
One objection that might be raised to an independent invention defense is that it would create 
some uncertainty for the patent holder about its ability to exclude rivals, since it would not know 
whether certain rivals are in a position to assert the defense.  Such uncertainty might well be 
present, but it is not a basis for rejecting the defense.  Surely the norm in business is for parties  
making investments to face uncertainty about the competition they are likely to encounter in the 
future.  Economic efficiency is promoted by aligning patentee rewards and contributions; 
reducing the risk faced by patent holders is not desirable per se and is not an independent goal. 
Going beyond these models, one of the great benefits of the independent invention defense is that 
it would, in one fell swoop, do away with many of the problems with patent hold-up.  A firm that 
independently develops the patented technology and incorporates the technology into its 
products would presumably qualify for the defense.
42  The independent invention defense also 
would go a long way to solving problems associated with continuation applications: if a patent 
holder adjusts its claims during the patent prosecution process to capture products already on the 
market, the firms selling those products may well be able to invoke the defense successfully.
43 
B. Some Practical Considerations 
The idea of an independent invention defense is not new.  To begin with, such a defense already 
exists in other areas of U.S. intellectual property law, namely in copyright infringement cases 
and in trade secret misappropriation cases.
44   Furthermore, a very limited version of the 
independent invention defense, called the Early Inventor Defense, already exists in U.S. patent 
law.  To see how this defense works, consider an alternative fact pattern.  Party A is again the 
                                                 
42 The unadorned defense would not necessary solve the problem of patent ambush in the standard-setting context, 
however.  If a product standard is adopted that uses a certain patented technology before the technology has been 
disclosed by the patent holder, the industry member(s) that developed and contributed that technology to the 
industry standard will presumably qualify for the defense.  Other industry members would not, however, unless the 
defense were extended to include parties to whom the independent inventor provided the technology before it was 
disclosed by the (subsequent) patentee. 
43 U.S. patent law provides some very limited protections for independent second inventors, in the form of 
“intervening rights” in situations where a patent holder broadens its claims in a continuation patent.  Even with the 
defense in place, however, it would still be important not to allow a vague and broad description of the invention 
provided in the initial application to capture subsequently introduced products that were not anticipated by the patent 
applicant at the time of the application was filed, since those products may not be covered by the defense.  
44 See Armond (2003) for an extensive discussion of these legal doctrines.  She also notes that independent invention 
can be a defense against a finding of willful infringement under current patent law.   Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 26 
patent holder.  But now suppose that Party B actually invented the patented technology first. 
How could Party A obtain a patent with this fact pattern?  Suppose that Party B did not consider 
this invention sufficiently novel and non-obvious to be patentable.  Instead, Party B kept its 
invention secret, and Party A subsequently filed for a patent.  According to U.S. patent law, with 
this fact pattern, Party A can obtain a patent.
45   Typically, Party A can then prevent Party B from 
practicing the invention.
46  However, in 1999 an exception to this rule was created, evidently in 
response to concerns that patents on business methods would be asserted opportunistically 
against prior users of those methods.  For business method patents only, Party B can invoke the 
Earlier Inventor Defense if Party B “actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year 
before the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before 
the effective filing date of the patent.”  35 USC 273(b)(1)  Congress is currently considering 
legislation that would greatly expand the Earlier Inventor Defense by applying it to all patents 
and requiring only that Party B “commercially used, or made substantial preparations for 
commercial use of, the subject matter before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 
Even in this expanded form, the Earlier Inventor Defense is not nearly as broad as a full-fledged 
independent invention defense, since it can only be invoked by first inventors, not independent 
second inventors.  Rather, the Earlier Inventor Defense is a form of “prior user rights,” under 
which a party using an invention before another party applies for a patent on that invention is 
granted the right to continue using that invention after the patent issues. From 1836-1952, U.S. 
patent law provided for such prior user rights, and such rights are the norm in other countries.
47  
The independent invention defense would not only protect prior users; it would go further and 
protect independent second inventors as well.
48 
                                                 
45 If Party B had publicized its invention, that publication would count as prior art, so Party A could not obtain a 
patent.  However, since Party B kept its invention secret, it becomes “secret prior art” that does not count as prior art 
for the purpose of evaluating the novelty of Party A’s invention.  Under U.S. patent law, a second inventor can 
obtain a patent if the first inventor abandoned, suppressed or concealed its invention. 
46 European law provides far more generous prior user rights to Party B under this fact pattern. 
47 Harriel (1996) discusses the history of prior user rights under U.S. patent law and reports (p. 563) that prior user 
rights can be found in almost every industrialized country other than the U.S.  
48 Shapiro (2006a) abstracts from the precise timing of invention between the two inventors, so the prior user rights 
he considers apply to second inventors who discover or use the invention prior to its disclosure by the first inventor. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 27 
While the basic idea behind the independent invention defense is clear enough, actually 
introducing such a defense would inevitably raise a host of practical issues.  A comprehensive 
practical and legal discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.  Fortunately, 
many of the legal issues have been addressed by Leibowitz (2002), Armond (2003), Lemley 
(2006), and, in greatest depth, by Vermont (2006), who strongly advocates a “reinvention” 
defense.  Here, we confine our attention to two of the most significant practical issues where the 
policy analysis is greatly informed by economic reasoning. 
First and foremost, the defense should only apply if the second inventor independently achieves 
the same (or a very similar) invention.  In principle, independence is clear enough, but in practice 
it may be very difficult to ascertain.  To fix ideas, consider the following timing patterns of 
invention by Party A, the patent holder, and Party B, who is invoking the defense: 
  (1)  Party B achieved the invention before Party A, but concealed its invention.
49 
  (2)  Party B achieved the invention after Party A, but before the public disclosure of 
  Party A’s invention.  
  (3)  Party B achieved the invention after Party A and after the public disclosure of 
  Party A’s invention. 
The public disclosure envisioned in (2) and (3) must be sufficiently detailed to teach a person of 
ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention. Public disclosure could come in the 
form of affirmative publication by Party A, the disclosure of Party A’s patent application by the 
PTO, or the issuance of the patent itself.  A full-fledged independent invention defense would 
apply in all three of these timing patterns. 
Establishing the defense under timing patter (1) appears straightforward.  Under timing pattern 
(1), there would presumably be no doubt that Party B is indeed an independent inventor.  This is 
the timing pattern under which the Early Inventor Defense applies.  Timing pattern (1) could also 
be handled by granting “prior user rights” to Party B, the first inventor.  As noted above, many 
European countries already grant prior user rights to parties who practice an invention secretly 
prior to the date at which another party applies for a patent on that invention.  This system 
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appears to work well in Europe, and there does not appear to be any reason to fear that granting 
such rights would cause significant practical problems in the context of the U.S. patent system. 
Extending the defense to timing pattern (2) also appears to be practical.  This would in effect 
grant prior user rights to parties who achieve an invention prior to the date at which another party 
discloses that invention (but not prior to the other party’s invention).  In principle, this appears to 
be a relatively minor step, but a helpful one in terms of aligning rewards with contributions and 
avoiding patent hold-up.  Under this timing pattern, Party B might be afforded a presumption 
that it is an independent inventor.  However, Party A could rebut this presumption by presenting 
evidence showing that Party B received proprietary information about Party A’s invention prior 
to its public disclosure.  Actual notice of the invention provided by Party A to Party B prior to 
Party B’s invention would also rebut the presumption.  This approach would have the advantage 
of encouraging Party A to disclose its invention at an early date (either publicly or on a selective 
basis) in order to limit the ability of others to invoke the defense.  Restricting the defense to 
timing patterns (1) and (2) would also give Party B an incentive to remain well informed about 
inventions that have been publicly disclosed and to focus its efforts on novel inventions rather 
than devoting resources in pursuit of inventions that have already been achieved.
50 
Establishing a full-fledged independent invention defense, including timing pattern (3), would 
raise some thorny additional issues that might prove insurmountable.  With this timing pattern, it 
would be especially important to place the burden of proof on the party asserting the defense.  
For this very reason, there may be limited scope for the defense to come into play, since it may 
be difficult for Party B to establish that its invention truly was independent of Party A.  Party B 
might produce lab notebooks indicating that it achieved the invention independently.  But Party 
B might have difficulty proving that it did not learn something from the public disclosure of 
Party A’s invention.  Sanctions for fraud would surely limit Party B from blatantly lying about 
                                                 
50 These latter efforts would be akin to the expenditures that are made by firms attempting to invent around an issued 
patent; these efforts are one form of deadweight loss associated with patents.  Leibowitz (2002, p. 2277) argues that 
the full-fledged version of the defense would encourage parties to independently re-invent patented inventions if the 
patent holder seeks too high a royalty.  He thus suggests a system under the patent disclosure would consist of two 
parts, a functional overview and a technical specification.  A party would not be precluded from invoking the 
defense simply because it had seen the overview, which would be publicly available.  In contrast, a party who had 
requested copies of the technical specification would be precluded from invoking the defense. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 29 
the receipt of such information, but there would undoubtedly be cases that were not clear cut.  
Plus, extending the defense to this timing pattern would create a disincentive to reading patents.  
A secondary practical issue involves the organizational scope of the defense.  If Party B were 
allowed extend the defense to third parties by contract, Party B would effectively have the right 
to issue licenses to use the patented technology.  A defense with this feature could have 
economic effects closer to placing the patented technology in the public domain than would a 
defense without licensing rights.  Even if the defense cannot be licensed in this way, the question 
still arises as to whether the party invoking the defense can extend its rights to other parties by 
assignment or through acquisition.  Current patent law addresses this issue.  The Earlier Inventor 
Defense is only a “personal defense.”  The  defense can only be assigned as part of an entire 
enterprise, and in that case a limitation applies to the sites at which the defense may be asserted.   
IV. Enhanced Patent Re-examination 
We now explore the economic effects of patent re-examinations using the reward/contribution 
framework developed above.  Re-examinations are potentially an important method to weed out 
improperly granted patents before they cause economic harm. 
The problem of patent quality is not a new one, but it has taken on increased importance with the 
explosion of patenting, especially in the information technology sector, and with widespread 
concerns over the ability of the PTO to identify relevant prior art given that nearly 450,000 
patent applications were filed at the PTO during fiscal year 2006.
51  The normal patent 
examination procedure is not an effective way to elicit information on prior art.  Applicants are 
not required to conduct a search for prior art, and third parties, who often possess a great deal of 
information about prior art along with the incentive to inform the PTO about the prior art, have 
little or no role to play.  While improvements in the initial examination process are no doubt 
possible,
52 many patents are of no commercial significance and a significant fraction are not even 
                                                 
51 See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (2006), Table 1, p. 121. 
52 The PTO recently started a peer-to-patent pilot project in which some patent applications in software design will 
be posted on the Internet so examiners can benefit from public comments identifying possible prior art.  See “Open 
Call From the Patent Office,” by Alan Sipress, Washington Post, March 5, 2007.  In August 2006, the PTO Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 30 
renewed.  Therefore, subjecting all patent applications to a very thorough review is not sensible 
or practical, as emphasized by Lemley (2001).   
In principle, a post-grant review procedure at the PTO, applied selectively to questionable 
patents with commercial significance, can correct for these deficiencies in the initial examination 
process.  Under current U.S. patent law, patent re-examinations are meant to serve this purpose. 
The vast majority of re-examinations are ex parte re-examinations; these can be initiated by the 
patent holder, by the PTO, or by third parties who then play no ongoing role.  Almost half of all 
ex parte re-examinations are initiated by the patent holder, usually to strengthen the patent in the 
face of new information about prior art.
53  A very small number of re-examinations are inter 
partes re-examinations, in which the challenger can participate actively.
54 
The patent re-examination system in the U.S. does not appear to be operating very effectively.
55  
There is a growing consensus that improvements are needed in the system by which issued 
patents can be challenged at the PTO.   Recommendation No. 1 by the FTC (2003) states: “As 
the PTO Recommends, Enact Legislation to Create a New Administrative Procedure to Allow 
Post-Grant Review of and Opposition to Patents.”  The NAS (2004, p. 95-103) recommends an 
“Open Review Procedure” to replace existing inter partes re-examinations and ex parte re-
examinations initiated by third parties.  All of the patent reform proposals currently being 
considered in Congress include enhanced post-grant opposition procedures.  These proposals 
raise a number of practical issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.  Here, we show how an 
enhanced re-examination procedure would help align patentee rewards and contributions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
established an accelerated review option under which patent applications are processed more rapidly if the applicant 
agrees to conduct its own search for prior art; see http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr36323.htm.  
53 See Graham, et. al. (2003), a highly informative empirical study comparing re-examinations in the U.S. with 
oppositions in Europe. 
54 See Federal Trade Commission (2003), Chapter 1, p. 28, and the National Academies of Science (2004), p. 96. 
55 Graham, et. al. (2003) present powerful evidence that the European opposition system is far more effective than 
the U.S. re-examination system.  They find that the rate of opposition at the European Patent Office is more than 
thirty times higher than the rate of re-examination at the U.S. PTO.  Furthermore, oppositions lead to the patent 
being revoked about one-third of the time and narrowed about one-third of the time, whereas re-examinations result 
in the patent being revoked only about 10% of the time.  Levin and Levin (2003) see significant welfare benefits 
from introducing a patent opposition process in the U.S. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 31 
A. Key Attributes of Patent Re-Examination Procedure 
For our purposes, there are two key attributes of any enhanced re-examination procedure.   
First, the procedure should allows third parties with significant relevant information to initiate re-
examination at an early date, before the patent is licensed and before users make investments 
specific to the patented technology.  In this respect, re-examination is very different from patent 
litigation, which takes much longer, and where the patent holder tends to control the timing.
56   
Second, the procedure must elicit significant information about patent validity or scope, causing 
a meaningful fraction of the patents that are re-examined to be invalidated or narrowed.  This is 
the primary function of the re-examination procedure.  However, as emphasized in Farrell and 
Shapiro (2007), these cannot be the only effects of the re-examination procedure.   The laws of 
probability imply that the patents surviving re-examination must emerge stronger: what does not 
kill a patent makes it stronger.  For example, suppose that a patent has strength 30%, i.e., there is 
a 30% chance that it will be held valid if litigated.  If subjected to re-examination, suppose that 
there is a 50% chance the patent will be found invalid, and a 50% chance the patent will survive 
the re-examination.  The basic laws of probability then imply that the patent will have a strength 
of 60% if it survives the re-examination.
57  This observation is very important just below: if 
some patents are weakened or invalidated by re-examination, others must be strengthened. 
B. Aligning Rewards and Contributions 
To understand the economic effects of enhanced re-examinations, we begin by asking how such 
re-examinations differ from patent litigation, the established procedure for testing patents.  Two 
differences are clear, and we will not dwell on them.  First, re-examination is far less expensive 
than litigation.  Second, the strong presumption of validity that applies in patent litigation need 
not apply in a re-examination.  To see how re-examinations affect the alignment between 
                                                 
56 According to the National Academies of Science (2004), p. 95-96, patent litigation typically does not occur until 
7-10 years after the patent is issued, after which it takes 2-3 more years to be resolved.  In January 2007, in the 
Medimmune v. Genentech case, the Supreme Court gave technology users much greater ability to control the timing 
of patent litigation by initiating a declaratory-judgment action to establish that the patent is invalid or not infringed. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 32 
patentee rewards and contributions, we focus on the difference in timing: re-examinations can 
occur shortly after the patent is issued, and at the instigation of parties other than patent holder. 
In Section II.B, we showed how excessive rewards to probabilistic patents can result from the 
public good nature of patent challenges.  Farrell and Shapiro (2007) show that an expanded re-
examination procedure could substantially reduce these excessive rewards for patents that are 
licensed to multiple downstream rivals.  We explained in Section II.B why any one downstream 
firm has a limited incentive to challenge the patent once it has been licensed to a number of the 
firm’s rivals: if the patent is upheld, the challenger is at a competitive disadvantage, and if the 
patent is invalidated, the challenger gains no competitive advantage.  This “relativity” logic is 
very different if a downstream firm can initiate a re-examination before the patent has been 
licensed: whether the patent is upheld or invalidated, the challenger will be on an equal footing 
with its rivals.   While there will remain a public good aspect to patent challenges, each 
individual downstream firm has a much stronger incentive to challenge a patent before it has 
been licensed to its rivals.  Allowing technology users to initiate re-examinations limits the 
ability of patent holders to strategically control the timing of licensing and patent litigation. 
Since the costs associated with improperly issued patents are also borne by final consumers, 
there are benefits from allowing entities that represent their interests (but may lack standing to 
initiate a court challenge of the patent) to initiate a re-examination, at least if they can present 
significant and credible new evidence to the PTO.  There already exist some such entities, and 
their role might expand if the rules were changed to encourage more patent re-examinations.
58 
An enhanced re-examination procedure would also help align rewards and contributions by 
reducing the ability of owners of probabilistic patents to engage in patent hold-up.  In Section 
II.C we showed how excessive rewards to probabilistic patents can result from patent hold-up, 
even if the alleged infringers are fully aware of the patent when they make their product design 
                                                                                                                                                             
57 Let q be the strength of the patent if it survives the re-examination.  Since the patent’s initial strength is 0.3, we 
must have 0.3 0.5 0.5 0 q =∗ +∗ , which gives  0.6 q = .  Formally, re-examination corresponds to a mean-preserving 
spread in the patent strength. 
58 For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has a “patent-busting project” (www.eff.org/patent) that seeks to 
overturn some Internet and software-related patents by gathering prior art and requesting PTO re-examination.  Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 33 
decisions.   As shown in Shapiro (2006b), a downstream user facing an infringement claim from 
the owner of a weak patent may have no way to prevent patent hold-up unless it can effectively 
test the patent’s validity (or scope) at an early date, before it makes technology-specific 
investments.  Patent litigation typically does not afford the user this option.  If the downstream 
firm’s only recourse to taking a license is to either avoid infringing or to produce an infringing 
product and then bear the risk of patent litigation, the patent holder will predictably capture some 
hold-up rents.  A strong re-examination procedure would give users a way of testing patent 
strength at an early date, bringing the patent holder’s return closer in line with its contribution. 
V. Additional Reforms to Align Reward and Contribution 
We now briefly consider three other reforms to the patent system to illustrate the utility of 
viewing patent system design through the reward/contribution lens. 
A. Limiting Injunctions in Selected Infringement Cases 
The Supreme Court recently held in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange that district courts have the 
power to deny permanent injunctions in appropriate patent infringement cases.
59  This ruling was 
a departure from the approach previously taken by the Federal Circuit, under which permanent 
injunctions were virtually automatic following a finding of infringement.
60  We showed in 
Section II.C that the threat of obtaining a permanent injunction can allow owners of probabilistic 
patents to obtain rewards that exceed their (expected) contributions.   Excessive rewards are 
especially likely in cases where the patent covers a minor feature in a complex product with a 
large price/cost margin.  Limiting the use of injunctions can correct for these excessive rewards.   
Lemley and Shapiro (2007) offer a procedure to determine whether an injunction should be 
granted, based on the costs of redesigning the product to avoid infringing and the time lag 
involved in such redesign.  In cases where the patent holder does not compete against the 
infringing firm, and where the infringing firm developed the technology independently of the 
patent holder, they propose that injunctions be denied if the redesign costs are large relative to 
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the value of the patented technology, and delayed if these costs are modest but involve a 
significant time lag.  Following the logic from Shapiro (2006b), these proposals are designed to 
prevent patent holders from capturing excessive returns based on hold-up, while protecting the 
ability of patent holders to earn rewards commensurate with their inventive contributions, 
regardless of whether they exploit their intellectual property internally or through licensing. 
The analysis on complementary innovations in Section II.D also is directly relevant for 
evaluating the rules regarding injunctions.  Even if the injunction threat does not provide a 
reward to the patent holder that exceeds its contribution, it can disadvantage other innovators 
whose investments are subject to hold-up, thus reducing efficiency and retarding innovation. 
B. Reasonable Royalties in Components Cases 
In patent infringement cases, courts often must determine the “reasonable royalties” damages 
that the infringing party must pay to the patent holder.  As discussed in detail by Lemley and 
Shapiro (2007), there is a danger that court-determined reasonable royalty rates will be excessive 
in cases where the patent covers only a minor feature of a complex and valuable product.  They 
present some evidence from actual damages awards that such errors are being made.  The 
problem is sharply illustrated by the recent case involving MP3 patents and Microsoft’s Media 
Player.
61  In that case, a jury awarded the patent holder Alcatel-Lucent $1.52 billion in damages;  
Alcatel-Lucent had argued that damages should be based on 0.5% of the total value of computers 
sold with Microsoft Windows (which includes the Media Player).  While 0.5% might seem like a 
small percentage royalty, it was applied to a very large base of sales, despite the fact that 
Windows computers have a literally thousands of components at the level of the patented MP3 
software elements.  Due to the enormous specific investments made in the MP3 standard, there is 
considerable scope for patent hold-up and excessive royalties in this type of situation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
60 The eBay case is relevant to the broader question of whether “property” rules or “liability” rules are more efficient 
in patent law.  See Calabresi and Melamed (1972), Kaplow and Shavell (1996), and Lemley and Weiser (2006). 
61 See “MP3 Patents in Upheaval After Verdict,” by Saul Hansell, New York Times, February 23, 2007.  This case 
also illustrates the importance of complementary innovation and royalty stacking, since a large number of separate 
parties own patents that read on the MP3 standard.  See “Patent Fights Are a Legacy of MP3’s Tangled Origins,” by 
Douglas Heingartner, New York Times, March 5, 2007. Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 35 
In principle, the courts could correct for this problem by making it clear that royalties should be 
based on the underlying value of the patented feature, in comparison with the best non-infringing 
ex ante alternative, and not based on the entire value of the infringing product.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court made just such a statement over 150 years ago.
62  One current patent reform bill 
includes the following language to address this problem:  
“In determining a reasonable royalty consideration shall be given to (A) the economic 
value that should be attributed to the novel and non-obvious feature or features of the 
invention, as distinguished from the economic value attributable to other features, 
improvements added by the infringer, and the business risks the infringer undertook in 
commercialization; [and other factors]” (Hatch-Leahy, S3818) 
Since patent royalties are negotiated in the shadow of litigation, insuring that “reasonable 
royalty” awards are not excessive would have a ripple effect on the far larger number of cases in 
which royalties are negotiated to avert or settle litigation. 
C. The Doctrine of Willful Infringement 
A party found to have willfully infringed a patent can be subject to treble damages.  While this 
doctrine may be useful to deter infringing parties from intentionally copying patented inventions, 
if interpreted too broadly it can provide excessive rewards to patent holders.  Lemley and Tangri 
(2003) criticize the doctrine of willful infringement and propose reforms to it, including 
evaluating willfulness based on the situation when the alleged infringer first adopted the patented 
technology, rather than treating subsequent continued use of the patented technology, after the 
infringer received notice from the patent holder, as willful infringement.
63  They also note that, to 
the extent that willfulness is based on whether and when the downstream firm actually read the 
patent, it deters users from reading patents and disrupts the patent disclosure function. 
                                                 
62   The Court explained that it would be “very grave error” to “instruct a jury that as to the measure of damages the 
same rule is to govern, whether the patent covers an entire machine or an improvement on a machine.” Seymore v. 
McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 491 (1853).  See also Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 
604, 615 (1912) (“[The] invention may have been used in combination with valuable patents made, or other patents 
appropriated by the infringer, and each may have jointly, but unequally, contributed to the profits. In such case, if 
plaintiff’s patent only created a part of the profits, he is only entitled to recover that part of the net gains.”). 
63 They discuss at length one aspect of the current doctrine, under which a party accused of infringement can avoid a 
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Reform of the willfulness doctrine can be informed by the reward/contribution approach.  To see 
how, consider a downstream manufacturer who has already designed its product and is then 
accused of patent infringement.  Even if the manufacturer did not independently invent the 
patented technology, it may well have a reasonable, good faith belief that the patent is either 
invalid or not infringed.  The manufacturer may well hold these beliefs even after receiving a 
threat letter from the patent holder.  For example, the manufacturer might believe that the patent 
is valid and infringed with a 60% probability; the patent holder might even hold the same beliefs.  
Treble damages are likely to undermine rather than promote economic efficiency in this 
circumstance.  Exposing the downstream firm to treble damages if it continues infringing will 
tend to exacerbate the patent hold-up problem inherent in this fact pattern.    One current patent 
reform bill includes the following language to reform the doctrine of willful infringement:  
“A court shall not find that an infringer has willfully infringed a patent … for any period 
of time during which the infringer had an informed good faith belief that the patent was 
invalid or unenforceable, or would not be infringed by the conduct later shown to 
constitute infringement of the patent.” (Hatch-Leahy, S3818) 
As with “reasonable royalties,” reforming the willfulness doctrine would have a ripple effect on 
the far larger number of cases in which licenses are signed to avert or settle patent litigation. 
VI. Conclusions 
The complexity of the issues involved in reforming the patent system can make patent reform 
appear to be an intractable problem.  On one side are those who stress the enormous social 
benefits flowing from innovation and the attendant risk that reducing the rewards to patent 
holders will unwisely discourage socially beneficial innovation.  This side stresses innovation 
spillovers and the importance of well-defined property rights for commercialization.  On the 
other side are those who see a broken system that often rewards patent holders who have 
invented little, if anything, at the expense of others who are themselves making the investments 
necessary for innovation.  This side stresses defects in the system by which patents are grants 
and the leverage afforded to patent holders, especially in the information technology industry. 
This paper argues that considerable clarity regarding patent reform can be achieved by viewing 
proposed reforms through the reward/contribution lens:  reforms that better align rewards and Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 37 
contributions, and especially those that prevent patent holders from earning rewards in excess of 
their social contributions, raise economic efficiency and promote innovation, regardless of the 
(unobservable) elasticity of supply of innovations.  Introducing an independent invention defense 
in patent infringement cases would predictably reduce excessive rewards.  An independent 
invention defense could encourage greater diversity in innovation, which could generate 
considerable benefits.  Strengthening the procedures by which patents are re-examined after they 
are issued would also help align rewards and incentives, especially for questionable patents and 
patents licensed to multiple competing firms.  Several other proposed reforms relating to patent 
infringement litigation also look promising using the reward/contribution framework: limiting 
the use of injunctions, clarifying the way in which damages based on “reasonable royalties” are 
defined, and narrowing the doctrine of willful infringement.  Recent empirical work suggests that 
all of these reforms would affect important, real-world situations that frequently arise.  The 
economic reasoning supplied here suggests that these reforms would enhance economic 
efficiency and promote innovation. 
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Appendix 
Two Simple Models in which Full Appropriation is Optimal 
Suppose that a single firm chooses its R&D budget aimed at a specific, well-defined invention. 
This is the only firm capable of pursing this invention.  The greater is the firm’s investment, the 
higher is the probability of achieving the invention. Formally, the firm can achieve a probability 
of success p by spending an amount  ( ) Cp, with  '( ) 0 Cp >  and  ''( ) 0 Cp >  for all 0 1 p << .  
As an illustration, consider the situation in which the firm can decide how many separate projects 
to pursue towards the invention.  If each project has a probability q of succeeding, and if all of 
the projects are statistically independent, then the probability of succeeding if N projects are 
pursued is  1 (1 )
N p q =− −  so  log(1 )/log(1 ) Np q =− − .  If each project costs k to pursue, the cost 
function is given by  ( ) log(1 )/log(1 ) Cp k N k p q == − − .    
Let the social contribution of the invention be V.  The expected social net benefits are given by 
() pVC p − .  The social optimum is achieved by picking a success probability  * p  which 
maximizes this expression;  * p  is characterized by  '( *) Cp V = .     
Suppose that the firm captures profits π  if it achieves the invention.  If the firm maximizes its 
expected profits, it will choose p to maximize  ( ) p Cp π − , so it will choose the “monopoly” 
probability  M p  which satisfies  '( ) M Cp π = . Clearly, the firm will spend the socially optimal 
amount pursuing this invention if and only if  V π = , i.e., with full appropriation.  If  V π < , the 
invention causes positive externalities, i.e., spillovers, and  * M p p < ; conversely, if   V π > , the 
invention causes negative externalities and  * M p p > .   This simple model therefore suggests that 
it is desirable to reward the firm with the full social contribution associated with the invention.  
This idea is rooted in the core economic concept of externalities. 
A very similar result can be obtained in another simple model which focuses on the timing rather 
than the probability of invention.  Suppose that the firm can achieve the invention at time T  with 
an expenditure of  () E T , where  () E T  and all costs and benefits in this model are measured in 
present discounted value as of time zero.  Suppose that the social contribution of the invention is 
() VT  if it is achieved at time T.  The social net benefits are  () () VT ET − , which we assume are 
concave in T.  The optimal date of invention  * T  is characterized by  '( *) '( *) VT ET = .   
Now suppose that a single firm is choosing how much to spend to achieve this invention, and the 
firm’s profit if it achieves the invention at date T is  () () TV T π α = .  This firm will pick T  to 
maximize ( ) ( ) TE T π − , leading to invention date  M T  defined by  '( ) '( ) MM VT ET α = .  With full 
appropriability,  1 α = , the firm’s choice is socially optimal,  * M TT =   With partial 
appropriability,  1 α <  the firm’s spends less than the social optimum on the invention, and Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 43 
discovery delayed:  * M TT < .  Likewise, with more than 100% appropriability,  1 α > , the firm 
spends more than the social optimum on the invention,  * M TT > . 
Social Contribution Associated with a Probabilistic Patent 
Consider a technology that lowers the cost of producing a given product from c to cv − .  Let the 
demand for this product be given by  ( ) Dp, where  p  is the downstream price.  The consumer 




≡∫ . For 
simplicity, assume that the downstream industry is perfectly competitive, so price equals cost. 
If the patented technology is not available, the downstream price is  p c = , output is  ( ) Dc, and 
total welfare is given by  ( ) Sc.  By similar reasoning, if the patented technology is freely 
available,  p cv =−, output is  ( ) Dc v − , and total welfare is given by  ( ) Sc v − . 
If the patent holder licenses its patent to the downstream industry at a per-unit royalty of rv ≤ , 
the downstream price will be  pcvr =−+ and output will be  ( ) Dc v r − + .  The total welfare in 
this case is the sum of consumer surplus  ( ) Sc v r − + , and the patent holder’s royalty revenues, 
() rD c v r −+ , so total welfare is given by  ( ) ( ) ( ) Wr Sc v r r Dc v r ≡ −+ + −+ .   
Let the patent strength be θ  where 01 θ < < .  If the patent is licensed at a per-unit royalty rate 
r , then the patent holder’s contribution is equal to the difference between  () Wr and the 
expected welfare that would have resulted in the absence of the patent holder, which is equal to 
() ( 1 )( ) Sc Sc v θ θ +− −.  Why?  With probability θ  , the patent holder truly invented the patented 
technology, so without the patent holder price would be  p c =  and welfare would be  () Sc.  
Likewise, with probability 1 θ −  , the patented technology was anticipated in the prior art (or 
obvious), so without the patent holder price would be  p cv = −  and welfare would be  ( ) Sc v − . 
Therefore, the contribution of the patent holder equals ( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ( )] Wr Sc Sc v θ θ − +− − , which is  
() () [ ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ] Sc v r r Dc v r Sc Sc v θ θ −+ + −+ − + − − . Since the profits of the patent holder are 
() rD c v r −+ , the gap between contribution and profits is  ( ) [ ( ) (1 ) ( )] Sc v r Sc Sc v θ θ − +− +− − .  
Following Farrell and Shapiro (2007), Theorem 3, we now show that if rv θ > , this gap is 
negative, so the patent holder’s profits exceed its contribution.  This requires showing that 
consumers are worse off paying the price cvr − +  for sure rather than paying the price c with 
probability θ  and the price cv −  with probability 1 θ − .  The expected price in the absence of 
the patent holder is  (1 )( ) cc v θ θ +− −, which equals ( ) cv v θ − + .  The price with the patent 
holder is ( ) cv r −+ .  If rv θ > , then the patent holder’s presence causes the expected price to 
rise.  Furthermore, the patent holder’s presence eliminates price risk: rather than face a gamble 
between a price of c and a price of cv − , with probabilities θ  and 1 θ −  respectively, consumers 
pay the price cvr −+ for sure.  Standard consumer theory tells us that consumers are risk loving Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 44 
in price:  '( ) ( ) Sp D p =−  and  ''( ) '( ) 0 Sp D p =− > , so the elimination of price risk makes 
consumers worse off.  Therefore, the presence of the patent holder makes consumers worse off: 
the patent holder raises the expected price and reduces (attractive) price risk. 
We can quantify the negative effect of the patent holder on consumers.  For small or moderate 
values of v,   ( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) Sc v r Sc v rS c −+ ≈ − −  and  ( ) ( ) '( ) Sc v Sc v S c − ≈− , so the gap between 
contribution and profits is (approximately)  '( )[ ] Scr v θ − .  Since  '( ) ( ) Sc D c = − , this is equal to 
() [ ] Dc r v θ −− .  Therefore, the gap between profits and contribution is (approximately) given by 
() [ ] Dc r v θ − .  For small values of v, the patent holder’s excess payoff is equal to the product of 
two terms: (1) the difference between the per-unit royalty and the expected per-unit costs savings 
attributable to the patent holder, and (2) the number of units sold. 
The gap between profits and contribution can usefully be expressed in terms of downstream 
industry revenues, which equal ( ) ( ) cvr D cvr −+ −+ .  Again for small values of v, these are 
approximately equal to  ( ) cD c .  The ratio of the profit/contribution gap to industry revenues is 










.  Since  p cvrc = −+≈, this ratio is 




.  If the downstream price is $100, the patent strength is 30%, the value 




 or 2% of industry revenues. 
Complementary Innovations 
Suppose that firm i can achieve a probability of invention of  i p  with an expenditure of  ( ) ii Cp, 
and one firm’s success is independent of the other.  Suppose that each firm i fully appropriates its 
social contribution  i V  if it is the only successful innovator.  (This is optimal in this model and 
does not require any subsidies.)  How should the social contribution of  B V  be allocated if both 
innovate?  Let  X  denote the portion of S  awarded to firm 1, with SX −  awarded to firm 2. 
Firm 1’s expected profits are  12 1 1 2 1 1 1 () ( 1 )( ) p pV X p pV Cp + +− − , so the first-order condition for 





= .  Likewise, Firm 2’s expected 
profits are  12 2 2 1 2 2 2 () ( 1 ) ( ) p pV S X p pV C p +− + − − , so the first-order condition for  2 p  is 







The expected social contribution is  12 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) B p pV p p V p p V C p C p + −+ −− − .  
Differentiating this expression with respect to X and setting the resulting expression equal to Shapiro Patent Alignment, Page 45 
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dX dX
− += .  








⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
, 
where  i ε is the elasticity of firm i’s probability of success with respect to the portion of the 
synergy it receives in the event that both firms succeed.   The right-hand side of this expression 
measures the relative sensitivity of firm 1’s vs. firm 2’s probability of success to the portion of 
the synergy that firm captures.  The optimal division of the synergy reflects this relative 
sensitivity.  This expression is similar to standard rules for Ramsey pricing. 
With symmetry and the appropriate concavity conditions, it is optimal for each of the two firms 
to appropriate half of the synergy in the event they are both successful.  With symmetry and 
concavity among N complementary innovations, the optimal appropriation share under a system 
without subsidies will simply be 1/N .  A system that rewarded the lion’s share of the synergies 
to one firm would be less efficient.   
Accounting for the Deadweight Loss Caused by Patent Monopolies 
We now return to the model in which a single party can achieve a given innovation with 
probability p according to the cost function  ( ) Cp.  We now suppose that stronger patent rights 
not only allow the firm to capture greater profits from the invention but also generate greater 
deadweight loss.  One simple, reduced-form way to model such situations is by introducing the 
function ( ) V π  to represents the social contribution of the invention if the patent system allows 
the firm to capture profits π  from the invention.  Here  (0) V  represents the social contribution 
from the invention if is not subject to patent protection.   Stronger patent protection allows the 
patent holder to capture greater profits but also leads to greater deadweight loss, so  '( ) 0 V π < .   
The firm chooses p to maximize  ( ) p Cp π − ; we denote the firm’s optimal choice by  M p , which 








= > . 
We now treat π  as a reduced-form policy variable representing the strength of patent rights.  The 
social net benefits as a function of π  are  ( ) ( ) MM p VC p π − .  So long as this expression is 
concave in π , maximizing these social net benefits with respect to π  gives the first-order 








+− = .  Using  '( ) M Cp π = , this becomes 








+− = .   Since  '( ) 0 V π <  and  0
M dp
dπ
> , this implies that  () V π π < , i.e., 













= .  This equation tells us that the fraction of social benefits not appropriated 
by the firm is equal to the ratio of two elasticities: the elasticity of social contribution with 
respect to the firm’s profits (numerator) and the elasticity of the probability of invention with 
respect to the firm’s profits (denominator). 